.

.德國馬歇爾基金會這份題為《若中國攻擊台灣：在「小規模衝突」與「全面戰爭」情境下對中國的影響》.

（If China Attacks Taiwan: The Consequences for China of Minor Conflict and Major War Scenarios）.Introduction by Bonnie S. Glaser: .

國際戰略學者專家分析認為,這是德國智庫傾力研究,分析,整理,蒐集資訊,深度的研究報告,值得海峽兩岸相關人士参考備用.德國是歐盟對於中國最大最多的投資國家與企業公司團體, 德國企業界從中國市場取得重大的利益,而且逐年增加資金及投資項目,其中又以汽車製造業.鋼鐵金屬業,石化工業,製藥工業等等,德國高速鐵路系統,相關技術幕後顧問支援中國,是很重要的雙方合作項目之一,德國的政府領導人像是前總理莫克爾夫人,正式訪問中國長達10年之久,每次訪華均有民間企業界同行,考察中國市進行各行各業的投資開發.所以德國馬歇爾基金會,此次慎重其事的提出完整性的研究報告,足見對中國的重視,合作雙贏才是正確的王道,至於中國是否以武力攻打台灣的利關係也就是說的清楚明白,不如美國的各大智庫,都是發表些偏激理論或是模擬兩可的模糊文章,騙取經費中飽個人私曩,如此而已,筆者具信海峽兩岸終於和平統一,中國統一,完成民族大業. 

.

德國馬歇爾基金會印太計畫總監（Bonnie Glaser）與另外六位作者，從四個層面檢視此類攻擊可能造成的影響：經濟,軍事,社會穩定與國際關係。

葛來儀向《日經亞洲》表示，中國國家主席習近平「民族復興」的最終目標，與這四個面向直接相關。

葛來儀說：「習近平必須確保中國經濟走在正確的軌道上，軍事能力持續成長；國內維持社會穩定；同時，中國基本上要與世界其他國家保持良好關係。」

葛來儀表示：「若全世界轉而反對中國，不與中國貿易、不對中國投資，那對他的『中國夢』而言將是災難性的。」

這份報告評估了兩種情境：一是持續數週的有限衝突；二是持續數月、最終以解放軍遭到決定性失敗告終的全面戰爭。結論指出，在這兩種情況下，北京所付出的代價都將是「巨大的」（substantial），且可能引發不穩定。

經濟代價巨大：中國仰賴外國投資與出口:在經濟層面，報告指出，台海戰爭可能引爆一場規模達數兆美元的危機。

中國經濟特別容易受到外部衝擊的影響，出口占國內生產毛額（GDP）的20%，是美國的兩倍。中國經濟也高度依賴投資帶動成長，這意味著中國發展仰賴持續的全球互動。

任何軍事行動，即便只是有限的灰色地帶衝突，都會立即引發經濟反噬，成本估計介於2兆美元至接近10兆美元之間。

更具破壞性的，將是長期後果：全球「去風險化」加速、供應鏈轉移，以及外國投資崩跌。報告警告，中國可能失去維持其發展模式所需的關鍵成長引擎。

軍事後果慘：10萬解放軍傷亡:在軍事層面，報告指出，大規模衝突將削弱中國在其他地區投射軍事力量的能力。

GMF所模擬的全面戰爭情境假設，解放軍將出現約10萬人傷亡，並在數月激戰後被迫撤退。台灣的總傷亡人數預估也約為10萬人，其中一半為平民；美國與日本的損失則為數千人。

即便是有限衝突，也會削弱中國執行其他任務的能力，包括在南海執法主權主張、巡防中印邊界、確保印度洋航道安全，或維持國內安全。社會穩定將瓦解、共產黨難維持秩序

美國企業研究院（AEI）資深研究員、也是本報告作者之一的庫柏（Zack Cooper）指出，對習近平而言，四個面向中最重要的其實是社會穩定。

庫柏表示：「任何威脅到國內安全或穩定的事情，可能都是他最關切的。」庫柏指出：「過去幾年已相當明顯，他對（共產黨）在社會中的角色，比對刺激經濟成長更加憂心。」

報告分析指出，一場失敗或曠日廢時的戰爭，可能引發社會對傷亡的敏感情緒，特別是在獨生子女家庭中。而經濟困境加劇，放大民眾不滿、新疆或西藏等地的族群動盪，以及學生領導的異議可能會被網路放大，都將是習近平最不願面對的困境。

中國的內部安全體系或許能應付一場短期、可控的衝突，但一旦戰事長期化，尤其若波及中國本土，就可能壓垮地方安全系統，並削弱黨維持秩序的能力。國際代價高：中共被制裁、台獨被世界承認報告也檢視了中國可能承擔的國際代價。報告預見各國可能對中國侵略行為採取一系列懲罰措施，包括驅逐中國外交官、斷絕外交關係、承認台灣獨立，以及退出由中國主導的組織，如上海合作組織、金磚國家機制或「一帶一路」倡議。

即便只有部分國家採取上述措施，其累積效應也可能對中國的全球影響力與經濟連結造成毀滅性打擊。

Research on the possibility and likely outcome of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait has expanded rapidly in recent years. Studies have focused on a broad range of questions related to deterrence, potential conflict dynamics, and possible conflict outcomes. Tabletop exercises have been used to identify gaps in the capabilities of the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Taiwan to assess potential escalation pathways and to better understand war termination strategies.1 Comparatively less attention has been devoted to the potential impact of cross-Strait conflict on the PRC itself and how that impact could shape President Xi Jinping’s risk calculus and decision-making about use of force against Taiwan.

Xi’s risk calculus is crucial to understanding if and under what circumstances Beijing might take aggressive actions against Taiwan because any such decision would carry profound political, economic, and strategic consequences for the PRC and for him personally. Xi has tied his legitimacy to putting the PRC on an irreversible path toward the “China Dream” of national rejuvenation by 2049 and unifying Taiwan with the motherland is deemed essential to that goal. Yet a military conflict over Taiwan would risk massive economic disruption, catastrophic military losses, significant social unrest, and devastating sanctions, all of which could turn his dream into a nightmare and undermine his political authority. Xi’s calculus must therefore weigh the perceived benefits of using force to achieve unification against the potential costs.

.There is a broad range of possible scenarios for PRC use of force against Taiwan. Potential actions taken by Beijing may vary in terms of intensity and duration. To make comparisons possible across the four papers, the authors were given two baseline scenarios, a limited conflict and a major war. Both are described in detail below. In outlining these scenarios, specific triggers were not established. They would nevertheless be important in determining international responses and subsequently would have implications for the PRC economy and possibly for social stability. Although the absence of a detailed trigger is a limiting factor, in any crisis multiple actors will draw their own conclusions about what sparked the conflict, so perceptions of who was at fault would differ across countries. 

The authors were also permitted to assess cases situated between a minor conflict and a major war, given that the economic, military, political, and international costs may vary discontinuously across a range of scenarios. All scenarios were assumed to occur between 2026 and 2030. The first scenario that authors assess is a minor conflict lasting several weeks. In this case, PRC ships and aircraft surround Taiwan after a series of deadly air and maritime confrontations between their forces.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) then attempts to conduct a “quarantine” of major ports in Taiwan. The United States intervenes and its warships escort commercial vessels through the blockade zone without incident. For the purposes of this scenario, dozens of PRC and Taiwan armed forces members are assumed killed in incidents in the air and at sea. There are no losses of foreign personnel. The conflict terminates when both sides agree to de-escalate the situation. This results in a relatively low intensity and short duration conflict.

The second scenario that authors were asked to review was a major conflict of several months that ends in a PLA defeat. This conflict starts with an amphibious invasion of Taiwan in which initial PLA missile strikes target Taiwan’s military and US forces in Japan and Guam. PRC forces land on Taiwan but supplies and follow-on forces are hampered by sustained Taiwanese and US strikes on ships and aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait.

After several months of heavy fighting, PRC forces withdraw to the mainland after losing roughly 100,000 personnel. Taiwan suffers approximately 50,000 military casualties and 50,000 civilian casualties. The United States loses 5,000 military members and 1,000 civilians, while Japan loses 1,000 military members and 500 civilians. Beyond this, no substantial foreign losses occur.

The conflict terminates when the PLA withdraws from the main island of Taiwan but retains control of the Kinmen and Matsu Islands. The purpose of these scenarios is not to assert that this is how a conflict over Taiwan would play out. The intention is instead to help describe in more detail what the costs would be to the PRC of a failed crossstrait operation. An important caveat is that the authors were asked to make their own assessments of the impact on the PRC in each of the four areas examined.

They were not asked to put themselves in Xi’s (or his successor’s) shoes. Xi and his colleagues might underestimate (or overestimate) the costs that the PRC would incur in these scenarios. Even if Beijing anticipates that the costs of taking an action against Taiwan are high, they might proceed despite the perceived risks. National leaders often make choices that overlook high costs if the perceived benefits are high or overridden by political considerations. Xi might conclude that not acting is more costly for him personally than taking a risky action that he believes is necessary to demonstrate resolve.

For example, if Xi views a step taken by Taipei as intended to permanently separate it from the PRC, and especially if he judges that Washington supports that goal, he is likely to move against Taiwan even if he expects that the PLA would suffer high casualties in attempting to seize it.

Overall, the authors of these essays demonstrate that the costs to the PRC of a failed military operation against Taiwan would be substantial. As noted above, this is not to suggest that Beijing would necessarily be deterred from starting a conflict in the first place. But it would be a mistake to simply assume that the PRC would prevail in a conflict over Taiwan.

The history of failed amphibious operations is long, and these essays demonstrate that an unsuccessful PRC-initiated conflict would have severe negative consequences for the country’s economy, military, social stability, and international standing.

..

.Minor Conflict Scenario (e.g., Blockade/Limited Strikes):Economic: Severe disruption of Taiwans massive trade ($1 trillion annually), impacting global supply chains, deterring foreign investment in China, and triggering international sanctions, crippling key sectors.

• Military: Potential for naval/air clashes, heavy losses, and a prolonged, costly struggle, draining resources.
• Social/Political: Increased nationalism but also potential unrest if costs mount; tests Xis authority as unification becomes costly rather than easy.
• International: Widespread condemnation, potential for US/allied intervention, and deep diplomatic isolation. 

• Military Catastrophe: High casualties, destruction of key military assets, potential for prolonged insurgency, and risks of escalation.
• Social/Political Crisis: Unprecedented internal instability, questioning the CCPs legitimacy and Xis legacy.
• Geopolitical Isolation: Complete severance of economic ties with many nations, becoming a pariah state, facing crippling long-term sanctions. 

• Xis Risk: Xis legitimacy rests on unification by 2049; however, the immense risks (economic ruin, military failure, political backlash) create a complex calculation against force.
• Pyrrhic Victory: Even successful military action could lead to a devastated Taiwan, a shattered Chinese economy, and an isolated, unstable China, making unification a hollow achievement. 

• Economic: Severe disruption of Taiwans massive trade ($1 trillion annually), impacting global supply chains, deterring foreign investment in China, and triggering international sanctions, crippling key sectors.
• Military: Potential for naval/air clashes, heavy losses, and a prolonged, costly struggle, draining resources.
• Social/Political: Increased nationalism but also potential unrest if costs mount; tests Xis authority as unification becomes costly rather than easy.
• International: Widespread condemnation, potential for US/allied intervention, and deep diplomatic isolation. 

• Economic Collapse: Complete shutdown of trade, massive capital flight, plunging GDP, and devastating global economic fallout affecting US, China, and Taiwan.
• Military Catastrophe: High casualties, destruction of key military assets, potential for prolonged insurgency, and risks of escalation.
• Social/Political Crisis: Unprecedented internal instability, questioning the CCPs legitimacy and Xis legacy.
• Geopolitical Isolation: Complete severance of economic ties with many nations, becoming a pariah state, facing crippling long-term sanctions. 

• Xis Risk: Xis legitimacy rests on unification by 2049; however, the immense risks (economic ruin, military failure, political backlash) create a complex calculation against force.
• Pyrrhic Victory: Even successful military action could lead to a devastated Taiwan, a shattered Chinese economy, and an isolated, unstable China, making unification a hollow achievement.