國際戰略專家學者分析認為美國總統川普,實際上就是生意人,以最低的成本取最大的利益,牠是老狐狸陰謀詭計多端,在國際時局變化之際,迅速拋出新政策略,企圖擾亂競爭對手的戰略佈局,以台灣/中國微例,川普就是兩面三刀的生意人,他企圖以商場仲介者的角色扮演,取得雙方的信任,並從中取得最大化的利益,例如電子晶片半導體製造以及對台灣強制購買美國軍事武器,甚至於放話預言,若日後中國出兵攻打台灣,不會派遣美軍橫越太平洋前往台灣作戰..

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How US Munition Depletion Puts Taiwan at Risk - The National Interest

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Taiwan in the Shadow of War ?..

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How US Munition Depletion Puts Taiwan at Risk.

China has a growing list of reasons to take Taiwan sooner rather than later.?

美國政治學者（Gregory J. Moore）20260817日於政治外交雜誌（The National Interest）發布專文，強調在中國攻台的13項關鍵指標內，已有11項達成，這對任何希望防衛台灣、嚇阻中國的美國與台灣人士而言，是一記警鐘。.

China is gearing up to invade Taiwan amid calls in US for American troops to defend island if its attacked .

Taiwan Strait Military Balance

台灣人認同持續遠離中國
中國人口結構老化
台灣半導體產業處於重要時期
半導體對中國重要性日益增加
美國對台灣承諾不斷增加
美台軍事合作仍有擴大空間
中國在反艦/高超音速武器方面占優勢
美國剛開始部署高超音速武器
美中關係緊張降低了戰爭門檻
關於美對華意圖、習的看法日益負面
民進黨持續執政至2028

而剩下的2點，則是讓共軍仍暫緩侵台行動的因素，包括：1.中共軍方仍需更多備戰時間、2.中國經濟面臨風險。

The ongoing conflict between the United States and Israel and Iran has handed Chinese President Xi Jinping one more reason to attack Taiwan in the near term. Since the advent of hostilities this past February, the United States has depleted many of its most advanced stocks of interceptors, cruise missiles, aerial drones, and other munitions and equipment that it would rely upon to help defend Taiwan, if it chose to do so.

China’s view of its own history values periods of territorial and political unity. Getting Taiwan back completes the “sacred task” of unifying the motherland.

.Thirteen indicators seem most likely to matter to Xi Jinping. For 11 of these 13 indicators, circumstances are more advantageous for an attack on Taiwan in the near term than they would be two or three years out.

Two indicators present opening windows of opportunity that may delay Chinese plans.

1. It goes without saying that giving the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) more time to prepare for a possible attack on Taiwan would give it a better chance of success. This argues against a near-term move on Taiwan.

2. China’s economy is struggling, with reports of major bank insolvency, high youth unemployment, and rising trade tensions not only with the United States but also with Europe and elsewhere as well. Some analysts see this as caution-inducing: if the home front isn’t economically stable, war’s uncertainties would discourage bold military moves.

Eleven indicators present closing windows of opportunity, which may accelerate Chinese plans.

1. The Taiwanese people’s identity is drifting away from the mainland.

2. Chinese demographic decline means China will have fewer fighting-age persons as a percent of the population over the long term.

3. The importance of Taiwan’s domestic semiconductor industry globally is a key indicator, and it is at its most valuable right about now.

.4. The growing importance of semiconductors to China (vs. China’s increasing isolation).

5. The US commitment to Taiwan is growing.

6. US military cooperation with Taiwan does not yet include exercises or a robust build-up of interoperability. If China waits longer, however, US-Taiwan military cooperation will likely only increase, with implications for Chinese strategy.

7. China has an apparent advantage now with its ship-killer hypersonic weapons. A few extra years before moving on Taiwan would likely mean China’s current hypersonic advantage disappears as US countermeasures improve.

.8. Similarly, the United States is just beginning to field its own hypersonic weapons.

9. The state of US-China relations is tense, lowering the bar for war.

10. Xi’s view of US intentions toward China is increasingly negative, as evidenced by recent statements.

11. The Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) win in the Taiwan 2024 elections means a party that Beijing calls “separatists” will run the island until at least 2028.

12. The depletion of many of the US’ most advanced stocks of interceptors, cruise missiles, aerial drones and other munitions because of the US-Israeli campaign against Iran is now a new factor we must consider in the Taiwan context. The US-Israeli military campaign that began February 28, 2026, and has continued, on and off, until the present, may prove to be a boon for China regarding Taiwan.

Given that any US military intervention over Taiwan would be primarily conducted by air and sea, these are exactly the munitions most needed, and reporting says it will take two to three years to replenish them; we have one more reason for Xi to take Taiwan sooner rather than later..

The argument presented here is not intended as a Nostradamus-like prediction that Xi Jinping will certainly invade Taiwan before mid-2027. Only God and Xi Jinping himself know whether that is the case, and Xi himself may not even know for certain. Rather, what is presented here is an argument that first, Xi has an interest in taking Taiwan; second, there are more reasons to move on Taiwan in the near term than there are for waiting 2–3 years; and third, this should be a wake-up call for any in the United States or Taiwan that seek to defend Taiwan or deter China.