.

china navy rise up so great. 055d-.

China’s rise is avowedly Mahanian in terms of both purpose and power. Sea power proponents in Beijing and places like that will tell you so. In terms of purpose, Mahan declares that commercial, diplomatic, and military access to important trading regions is the uppermost goal of maritime strategy, bar none. Because of China’s exceptionally forbidding strategic geography, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chiefs have to worry about access from the time a ship leaves harbor in East Asia until the time it docks in an Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, or European seaport. Hence Beijing’s effort to erect an anti-access buffer to hold the U.S. Navy at a distance: it eases the challenge of gaining access from the China seas to the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and points beyond.

In terms of power, Mahan’s famous six “determinants” of sea power indicate which would-be seafaring societies have the right stuff to go to sea in the search for commercial, diplomatic, and military access and the prosperity and power it promises. The determinants also suggest what the leadership of a prospective seafaring society should do to hasten the process along and make it more robust, such as enacting laws and policies encouraging people to engage in maritime industries, construct the infrastructure to support merchant and naval fleets, and on and on. His writings describe and prescribe.

It’s important to note that Mahan’s influence on naval operations can, and we believe does, stop with his injunction to seek “command of the sea,” meaning relative supremacy in waters that matter to China. There are many ways to skin a cat. Navies and affiliated joint forces can seek maritime command through a variety of methods, not just by sending out battle fleets for symmetrical force-on-force engagements as in the age of sail, and to a lesser degree, the age of steam. For instance, they can execute an “active defense” until such time as they are strong enough to venture a decisive battle. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strategists read Corbett and approve of his concept of active defense, but more importantly, active defense has been graven on the CCP’s way of strategy and operations since Mao fashioned the concept in the 1930s. Beijing’s 2015 white paper, “China’s Military Strategy,” reaffirms that active defense remains the “essence” of the party’s way of war, just as it was for the Red Army during the Chinese civil war. China’s methods are nothing new, even though it uses different implements to put them into effect at sea.

So people should not make too much of the operational and tactical implications of Mahan’s writings for China’s navy. They should pay a great deal of attention to what he says about maritime strategy and amassing sea power to execute strategy. These are the ideas to which CCP leaders have declared fealty.

Red Star Over the Pacific: A Conversation with James Holmes on China’s Maritime Rise

CIMSEC had the opportunity to discuss the second edition of Red Star Over the Pacific with James Holmes, current J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College. In this conversation Holmes lays out how the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan helped inform China’s maritime rise, how China built a formidable naval warfighting capability, and how the U.S. and its allies can more effectively deter China militarily. ..

.

..

.If you want to invade coastal Maine, fight!.

Professor Jim Holmes – writings about navies and the sea.

Please read again "RED STAR OVER THE PACIFIC ".thanks.

傳聞中國第三艘航空母艦.(福建號).Type 003.CV-18.

將於202412.舉行下水典禮?..

本書作者JH.再其重要理論著作,中國海軍似乎已經實現其書籍內容的描寫,儘管距離2030.年代尚有8年時間,但是對於中國海軍強勢崛起,卓然有成的實際表現,令美國海軍甚驚訝與甚為不解,為什麼自2000年起至-2020年在這20年裡,中國海軍積極奮戰不懈,努力以赴,自行研發,設計,製造,生產,屬於中國海軍所需求的各式各樣的軍艦,從常規潛水艇到核子動力潛艦,SSBN/SSN.導向飛彈驅逐艦DDG.,

導向飛彈護衛艦FGG,倆棲登陸艦LHD.運輸艦,醫療船,綜合補級艦,常規動力航空母艦,以及秘秘建造中的核子動力航空母艦,核子動力導向飛彈巡洋艦等等艦艇,足以讓中國海軍銳不可當,變成僅次於美國海軍世界上第二名強勢的海軍.著實令美國海軍害怕希望在2030年的南太平洋與中國海軍大決戰是勝利的?

然而.Jim Holmes,又是如何描述美國海軍的慘敗與慘不忍睹,美國海軍第七艦隊竟然被中國海軍徹底擊敗與擊潰,沉沒於南太平洋的深海底層,2030.年的中美2強海軍大決戰,中國海軍使用最新的軍艦,包括核子動力航空母艦CVN.驅逐艦DDG.護衛艦FFG.核子攻擊型潛艦SSN.以及核子動力巡洋艦NBCU.綜合補級艦與醫療船組成的太平洋特遣艦隊,遠征太平洋,與美國太平洋第七艦隊,展開生死大決戰,最後雙方艦隊於南太平洋某海域相遇,隨即展開人類歷史上最大規模與最為壯烈海戰,美國太平洋第七艦隊,總數量及總噸位是中國海軍的2倍,然而為什麼被擊敗?

2030.年中美海軍大決戰,猷如1895年中日甲午大海戰的翻版,舊事重演,中國海軍運用新奇的海洋戰略以及配合創新的戰術與新武器,在短短3小時內,就將稱霸85年(1945-2030)之久的美國太平洋第七艦隊,打得落花流水,落荒而逃?

美國海軍損失慘重無比,3艘核子動力航空母艦CVN.全面擊潰擊沉,死亡將近10000萬餘名海軍官兵,空軍架機逃跑者約為100 名左右? 其餘皆葬身南太平洋海底.

4艘驅逐艦,4艘巡洋艦.6艘護衛艦.2艘核子潛艦? 1艘補級艦,至於中國海軍各自損失1艘驅逐艦及護衛艦而已,大獲全勝.美國太平洋第七艦隊可以說是全軍覆沒.

2031.年美國向中國議和,雙方約定以國際換日線為基準劃清界線.International Date Line.東經180.度以東的太平洋水域屬於美國勢力範圍管轄,換句話說東經180.度以西的太平洋水域屬於中國勢力範圍管轄,雙方從此以後井水不犯河水,亦就是楚河漢界,搞清楚摸明白,此後雙方海軍越過界線舉辦演習,救援任務,等等活動,皆必須72小時前通知雙方政府及海軍司令部.這樣一來實現了中國領導人

習XX.早在2015年時訪問美國,就明白告知美國,說出太平洋夠大,夠深,夠廣,絕對容納得下中國與美國的海軍共同擁有.如此一來美國海軍太平洋的第七艦隊被中國海軍打敗擊潰,才承認太平洋由中國與美國括分.真的是敬酒不吃要吃罰酒.

.

.

. It doesn’t mean reciprocating China’s naval preparations in symmetrical fashion, although a lot of what we must do is regenerate habits, skills, and hardware we need to compete the way we did against the Soviet Navy. That part will look symmetrical. We started delving into an asymmetrical approach back in 2012, after the first edition of Red Star over the Pacific, but before the idea of island-chain defense became common wisdom in journals, think tanks, and the Pentagon. We preached island-chain defense before it was cool. The basic idea is that we need to turn geography, alliances, and asymmetric advantages in hardware and tactics into a decisive strategic edge. If Beijing frets about access, and if we and our allies stand athwart its access to the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, that constitutes invaluable potential leverage.

In other words, we can mount an anti-access strategy of our own along the first island chain, using submarines, sea mines, unmanned vehicles of various kinds, aircraft, and land-based firepower to seal up the straits between the islands constituting the island chain. We can convert the island chain into a “Great Wall in reverse,” a barrier to Chinese maritime movement rather than an edifice that keeps out China’s foes. Display the capability to do all of that at manageable cost to ourselves and allied governments, and we will have erected a formidable deterrent to CCP mischief. A few weeks back The Economist ran an article about China’s strategic geography, including a nice mention of Red Star over the Pacific, and closed by quoting Professor Hu Bo—one of China’s preeminent maritime strategists—as observing that challenging island-chain defense would be a “suicide mission” for China’s armed forces. We agree—and hope the CCP leadership does as well.

.

Combining a close knowledge of Asia and an ability to tap Chinese-language sources with naval combat experience and expertise in sea-power theory, the authors assess how the rise of Chinese sea power will affect U.S. maritime strategy in Asia. They argue that China has laid the groundwork for a sustained challenge to American primacy in maritime Asia, and to defend this hypothesis they look back to Alfred Thayer Mahans sea-power theories, now popular with the Chinese. The book considers how strategic thought about the sea shapes Beijings deliberations and compares Chinas geostrategic predicament to that of the Kaisers Germany a century ago. It examines the Chinese navys operational concepts, tactics, and capabilities and appraises Chinas missile force. The authors conclude that China now presents a challenge to Americas strategic position of such magnitude that Washington must compete in earnest.

.

諸位讀者,可曾知情南太平洋的某海域,就是2030年時期,

中,美海軍大決戰的地區?

因為那裏海域遼闊,寧靜安詳,日照充足,風平浪靜? 

適合海戰,即使艦艇被擊破擊沈也就是說完整下降沉沒深處,無人知曉,但是南十字星會指引死亡者的靈魂回家的路程?.與方向?

WHERE IS SOUTH PACIFIC OCEAN,

for CHINA vs USA navy Maine, fight ,!. ? ..

吾人祈禱南十字星,照亮南太平洋,指引美國海軍官兵死亡者,的靈魂,回歸家園安息.阿門.

.

We should be clear about the terminology here. Active defense is a Maoist term and ubiquitous in CCP writings about strategy, operations, and tactics. (It’s far from uncommon in Western writings as well, not just in Corbett’s works but those of Bradley Fiske and many others.)

“Fortress fleet” is a term we use to describe the PLA’s use of shore-based firepower to supplement the power of the battle fleet. The term comes from Mahan’s critique of Russian naval strategy during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Russian naval commanders had a bad habit of huddling under the guns of Port Arthur for protection against the superior Imperial Japanese Navy. Mahan deemed this a “radically erroneous” way of naval operations because the range of a gun was so short in those days—a fortress fleet was confined to a very small circle on the map whose range was the effective firing range of a cannon circa 1904-1905. That had all manner of ill effects. But that doesn’t render the concept of shore-based fire support moot. If I have the scouting capability, command and control, and firepower to rain ordnance on an enemy fleet scores, hundreds, or thousands of miles out to sea, exactly what is the objection to a fortress fleet? None whatsoever. You have plenty of sea room to roam while still tapping fire support. You can have the best of both worlds, blue-water mobility plus that great shore-based equalizer.

Bottom line, it is misleading in the extreme to run direct comparisons between the PLA Navy and the U.S. Navy and console ourselves that we remain ahead. If we run comparisons between the fraction of the U.S. Navy that would appear on scene at likely battlegrounds in the Western Pacific and the massed PLA Navy backed by shore-based firepower and we look like we’re behind, well, that reflects reality. It matters not a whit who has the stronger navy overall; it matters who can concentrate the most firepower at scenes of action for as long as it takes to accomplish tactical and operational goals. As Nelson quipped, a ship’s a fool to fight a fort. If Fortress China can reach far out to sea and lend accurate firepower in support of the battle fleet, that’s a discomfiting prospect. Do not give in to the temptation to view maritime competition and warfare solely as a navy-on-navy thing...