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..德軍重出江湖再戰美國與俄羅斯?.

年輕的德國阿兵哥是募兵制而不是徵兵制的,與第二次世界大戰時期的狂熱從軍潮,跟隨納粹黨希特勒出征襲捲歐洲,有所不同的時空背景,德軍需要希特勒再世?

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How Germany is strategizing to become Western Europe’s biggest

military power? 

.Germany is ready to lead militarily. Its military is not.Three days after Russia attacked Ukraine last month, Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany stood in Parliament and announced the biggest rearmament programme for his country since the end of the Cold War, vowing not only to increase the defense budget beyond the NATO target that Germany had failed to hit for years but to invest an immediate 100 billion euros — two full years of military spending — to turn around years of underfunding of the German military.

It was a revolution in a country whose Nazi past had long made it reluctant to invest in military power. By the end of his 30-minute speech, Scholz had overturned a ban on shipments of arms to Ukraine, backed armed drones and committed to buying new fighter jets that can drop nuclear bombs, sealing Germany’s continued role in NATO’s system of nuclear sharing.

德軍要重出江湖? 再度挑戰俄羅斯及美國?

German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik).

德國國際與安全事務研究所是德國國際關係與安全研究領域的智囊團。

這是一個與聯邦政府關係密切的半官方組織,它就外交和安全政策問題向聯邦議院和聯邦政府提供諮詢意見,還向與德國有關的國際組織的決策者提供諮詢,尤其是歐盟,北約和美國,聯合國。

SWP被認為是歐洲在國際關係中最有影響力的智囊團之一.最近因為俄羅斯與烏克蘭戰爭影響建議德國政府應該增加國防預算經費將聯邦國防軍轉變為一支高效率,現代化的軍隊,能夠可靠地威懾敵人並保衛歐洲。柏林將一次性撥出 1000 億歐元的特別預算,用於採購新型戰鬥機和防空系統。德國的國防預算也增加到 GDP 的 2% 以上,成為歐洲軍事預算最大的國家。

國際戰略專家分析認為,自從第二次世界大戰結束後76年以來,美國常年駐軍德國,壓制德國不得發展軍事武器,尤其是戰鬥機與導向飛彈以及海軍的驅逐艦,至於潛艇僅有傳統型的柴油與電力混合型的潛艇,如果外銷必須經由美國許可,但是每年NATO.及美國在歐洲的軍事演習,德國所分擔的經費以及派遣的坦克車(豹2型)的數最多,以及支援美軍的演習戰略物質也就是說大部份的支出由德國買單,美國的理由是說德國為世界第三大經濟體,歐洲第一富裕的強國,可以多多益善支援美國及NATO.導致於傳聞有不肖的美軍勾結NATO.及德國政客,浮報演習經費預算,逐年攀升,遭人檢舉倒賣及盜賣軍用戰略物質分贓牟利,經由德國總理莫克爾夫人組成專案小組明查暗訪後杜絕上述不法事件.  

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德國新任總理OS.基本上不會受到美國控制與約束,他在202202.俄烏開戰前,才被美國總統拜登約見訪問華盛頓期間,德國被美國威脅不准開通NS2.LNG PIPE LINE.接受俄羅斯的天然氣使用,在訪問結束時,他接受國際新聞媒體的追問,是否屬實,被美國總統拜登口頭警告,OS.沉默以對,新聞記者並且翻白眼球,迅速乘車直奔機場返回德國.

.Beim morgigen Gipfeltreffen der G7 in Brüssel wird über den weiteren Kurs nach dem Angriff Russlands auf die Ukraine beraten. Für die G7 besteht mit Blick auf ihre Partnerstaaten und den kommenden G20-Gipfel Klärungsbedarf, meint Lars Brozus..

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.德國依舊是G7.工業大國的領頭羊.

.德國反對抗議俄羅斯侵略烏克蘭逮到機會,編列1000億歐元擴充軍事力量

.The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (German: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik; SWP) is a German think tank in international relations and security studies. A semi-official organization with close links to the federal government, it advises the Bundestag (the German parliament) and the federal government on foreign and security policy issues, and also advises decision-makers in international organisations relevant to Germany, above all the European Union, NATO and the United Nations. SWP is regarded as one of Europes most influential think tanks in international relations. It is headquartered in Berlin and incorporated as a foundation.

.The Council (Stiftungsrat) is SWPs highest supervisory and decision-making body. It has three “benches”

1. “the Bundestag bench”, consisting of one representative of each parliamentary party (currently 4).
2. “the Government bench”: at least seven representatives of the federal government at the suggestion of the head of the Chancellery (currently 8).
3. “the private bench”: at least seven eminent figures from academia, business and public life (currently 8).

SWP research is organised into eight divisions totalling about 60 researchers: EU/Europe; Centre for Applied Turkish Studies, International Security; the Americas; Eastern Europe, Eurasia; Middle East and Africa; Asia; and Global Issues.

The “New Power, New Responsibility” project.

A paper co-produced with the German Marshall Fund entitled “New Power, New Responsibility” (November 2012 – September 2013) called on Germany to assume more responsibility for dealing with “those who disrupt the international order”. It argued that Germany and the EU need to show more willingness to act on international security issues, recommending inter alia that “Europe and Germany need to develop formats for NATO operations that make them less dependent on US suppor.

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美國利用LNG.制衡歐盟的發展控制NATO.

德國國際事務與安全研究所（Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik）國際安全組主任（Claudia Major）與德國對外關係委員會研究主任（Christian Mölling）在《世界政治評論》（World Politics Review）撰文指出.

〈烏克蘭戰爭導致德國軍事革命〉,說明德國之所以突然採取行動,不是因為想成為一個好盟友並幫別人一個忙,而是因為德國自己感受到威脅。

CM & CM指出,在國防和安全方面,德國面臨的最大任務是改變思維,承認軍事力量是推動國際關係中的一大要素,柏林有責任維護歐洲的和平與安全。

.Germany troops  rise up again?

Germany’s dramatic reversal on defense, explained

Russia’s Ukraine war forced a turning point in how Berlin sees itself in the world.

.German foreign and defense policy. Most strikingly, Scholz proposed massive investments in Germany’s defense and security, reversing the country’s reluctance to build up its military. It’s a seismic shift not just for the country, but potentially for Europe and the trans-Atlantic relationship.

“It’s really revolutionary,” said Sophia Besch, a Berlin-based senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform. “Scholz, in his speech, did away with and overturned so many of what we thought were certainties of German defense policy. He ticked off just one taboo after the next.”

Scholz said Germany would need to invest much more in its security, “in order to protect our freedom and our democracy.” He introduced a €100 billion ($113 billion) special fund for investments in the Bundeswehr, Germany’s armed forces. He committed Germany to spending more than 2 percent of its GDP on defense — a target all NATO member countries agreed to meet, but one that less than half actually do. Germany spent a total of about €47 billion on defense in 2021. And, if that wasn’t enough, Scholz also said Germany would seek to guarantee a more secure energy supply — as in, away from dependence on Russia and its natural gas, a little more than a week after he paused approval on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline..

Scholz called Putin’s war a “Zeitenwende” — a turning point, or “watershed moment.” But as German speakers tried to explain, it’s larger than that. It’s akin to the dawning of a new era.

德國總理OS.他會成為支持德軍重建復甦的靈魂人物? 

德國經過76年漫長的等待,終於抓住俄羅斯與烏克蘭戰爭的機會,要投入巨額資金,重整軍事力量,成為歐洲最強大的軍事大國,美國絕對不會座視不聞不問.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz arrives for a visit of the German armed forces’ Joint Operations Command in Schwielowsee, Germany, on March 4, 2022 (AP photo by Michael Sohn). On Feb. 27, nothing less than a revolution took place in Germany. In a 30-minute speech to parliament, Chancellor Olaf Scholz overturned all the...

The War in Ukraine Just Caused a Revolution in German Military Affairs.

Since the end of the Cold War, Germany has not felt threatened militarily. As a result, Berlin has felt little urgency to invest in its military and was reluctant to engage in the various military operations of the post-Cold War period. Where Germany did engage militarily—with troop deployments on NATO’s eastern flank, combat forces in Afghanistan or military trainers in Mali, for instance—it was largely to express solidarity with NATO allies, in the former two cases, and with France, a NATO ally and close European Union partner, in the latter. That’s not to say that Germany never took threats seriously, when it came to concerns over climate change, migration and even its economic wellbeing, for instance. But the same was never true with regard to military and security threats. ...

.German politics is normally characterized by a cautious continuity, finely balanced and slow to adapt to changing circumstances. But it remains able to surprise. In the past week, Chancellor Olaf Scholz and his government have carried out a revolution in Germany’s foreign policy, discarding in a matter of days the outmoded assumptions of Berlin’s post-Cold War dreams and setting a course for confrontation with Russia that will bring dramatically increased resources and modernize the country’s armed forces.Each day has brought new breaks with German tradition. On Feb. 27, in an extraordinary session of the German parliament (the first-ever Sunday meeting), Scholz described the Russian attack on Ukraine as a “turning point” that required a German national effort to preserve the political and security order in Europe. Scholz announced the creation of a one-time 100 billion euro ($113 billion) fund for the German military this year and committed Germany to spending 2 percent of GDP on defense henceforth. He highlighted Germany’s contributions to NATO and expanded commitments, including its deterrent presence in Lithuania and making German air defense systems available to Eastern European member states. He underscored Germany’s nuclear role in NATO and indicated that the government would likely acquire F-35 aircraft instead of the previously planned F/A-18 Super Hornet purchase. The chancellor emphasized Berlin’s responsibilities within NATO but in a departure from the style of German defense policy also defined these measures as ensuring Germany’s national security. Decades of German taboos and sensitivities dissolved amid applause from the mainstream parties and the pro-Ukrainian chants of upwards of half a million demonstrators throughout central Berlin.

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由此看來德國逮到機會,藉以擴充國防軍事力量,充實3軍部隊,以德國的工業水準,不難造出先進的戰鬥機,導向飛彈,驅逐艦以及其他高科技武器,抗衡俄羅斯,其實也就是說反抗美國的長期駐軍壓制,因前德國總理莫克夫人曾經建議與法國共組"歐洲聯軍"擺脫美國的壓制,甚至於傳聞德國要建造核子動力航空母艦及核子潛艦其意義非同小可,美國絕對不會同意德國編列1000億歐元擴充軍隊,只有壓迫德國購買更多的F-35.隱形戰鬥機.擴充空軍而已.

值得國際戰略專家注意,德國是否恢復過來軍國主義,假借抵抗俄羅斯的名義,擴展軍事力量,其實也就是說準備抵抗美國,.換句話說德國要求使用俄羅斯的天然氣,藏有不可告人的秘密?

難怪美國要阻止德國與俄羅斯的"合作",就是終止NS2.甚至於美國揚言要炸毀NS2.LNG.PIPE LINE.

.NS2.LNG.可以帶動德國的軍事工業復甦,德國必須建設強大的海軍力量.

.Germany army rise up again?

德軍重整雄風再度崛起,依舊困難重重,

受制於NATO.的規範制衡與約束.

.Germany’s Defense Challenges

Germany’s standing commitment to raising its defense spending to 1.5 percent of GDP by 2025 is questioned by continued disagreements in the governing coalition between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). As Germany’s export-driven economy threatens to stall, the SPD finance minister successfully pressed CDU Defense Minister von der Leyen to accept a smaller defense budget of 1.25 percent for the next five years. Current estimates foresee a 1.37 percent rate for 2020. The defense ministry has managed to consistently increase defense spending for the last five years, but the sticker shock of major projects makes each one a contested issue.

My own experience is that Germany’s military retains the thorough professionalism earned through the years serving as NATO’s front line, but its uniformed leaders are painfully aware of how little German society cares about security policy. As Nora Müller noted in a recent article, the Germans would like to behave like a “big Switzerland,” focused primarily on their economy, and remain blissfully uninterested in interstate competition beyond the economic sort. Germans’ recent mistrust of the United States makes their support for collective security even less likely. The national mood reminds me of Trotsky’s aphorism: “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.” The only time Germans spare a thought for the Bundeswehr is when the media fixates upon an embarrassment, like the ballooning repair costs for the school ship Gorch Fock or the annual report on equipment readiness. It goes without saying that if the German people wanted to stop reading such reports, they would support an increased allocation to defense spending. But the reality of modern military procurement is that systems are exorbitantly expensive, especially when considered in terms of life cycle costs. Indeed, one of the key problems facing the Bundeswehr is the scarcity of replacement parts for major weapon systems. After all, Germany is not the kind of country that will keep a tank factory open just to send them into storage. And while the generals who frequently visit the course maintain that the readiness trend has evened out and will only improve going forward, German soldiers display the customary black humor universal to soldiering when we start talking about tanks or fighter jets’ operational readiness.

Although my German colleagues often look enviously at the high status of the U.S. military in American society or the plethora of high-end equipment at its disposal, I try to remind them that their country’s security reality is far different than the U.S. military’s. The United States has to look far beyond NATO, whether to safeguard the global commons, defend allies in the Pacific, or continue prosecuting longstanding conflicts in the Middle East. NATO partners play a role in many of these operations, but none has or needs the same global reach at scale. Germany has not needed to think beyond Europe since before the Cold War, and the modern Bundeswehr came of age training and equipping its forces to fight a delaying action against the Warsaw Pact, on its own soil, until reinforcements could arrive. Getting to the point where Germans could imagine their troops in armed combat operations far beyond their borders took the shock of September 11 and invoking NATO’s Article 5....................................................

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