美國詹姆斯頓基金會《中國簡報》2月21日文章，原題：中國的特種部隊——學到的經驗教訓和潛在的使命 在過去10—15年，中國日益重視本國特種部隊的發展。美國國防部發佈的一份有關中國軍力的報告稱，“自1991年海灣戰爭以來，人民解放軍投入巨大的資源以發展特種部隊”；而且，中國將這種精英部隊的發展視為陸軍現代化的組成部分。為此，人民解放軍於上世紀90年代組建了多支類似于美國陸軍遊騎兵的特種部隊，以作為對現有的遠端偵察部隊的補充。這種重視提升特種部隊作戰能力的舉措，部分受到了中國對馬島戰爭和海灣戰爭等軍事衝突中特種部隊所起作用分析的激發。

　　近幾年來，中國對提升特種部隊作戰能力的重視似乎愈加強化，這從中國發佈的2006年國防白皮書就可見一斑。該白皮書的其中一段將改善特種作戰能力列為陸軍軍事現代化的優先項目之一，稱“陸軍逐步推進由區域防衛型向全域機動型轉變，提高空地一體、遠程機動、快速突擊和特種作戰能力”。幾乎可以肯定，中國對特種部隊這種日益濃厚的興趣源於其對國外特種部隊在阿富汗和伊拉克戰爭中扮演角色的分析。中國的分析家似乎傾注了很大的注意力去觀察和分析美國和聯軍特種部隊在這兩場衝突中的表現。

　　中國的軍事分析家認為，特種部隊在阿富汗戰爭以及近來其他的衝突中所發揮的作用，突出表明了特種部隊在當今資訊時代局部戰爭中的重要性。他們認為，特種部隊已從幕後走出，進入舞臺的中心，在衝突中發揮關鍵作用。特種部隊不僅僅限於在戰術和行動層面發揮作用，它還可以直接實現戰略目標。因而，中國的分析家認為，特種部隊已經成了高科技局部戰爭中一種重要的力量；由於其靈活性和實用性的特點，無論是在低烈度衝突還是中、高烈度衝突中，對於軍事指揮官來說特種部隊都不可或缺。

　　中國對外國特種部隊在最近的衝突中所發揮作用的評估，對人民解放軍發展特種部隊作戰能力有著重要影響。從相關的出版物可知，人民解放軍計畫將這些學到的“經驗教訓”用於其自身的特種作戰行動。總的來說，人民解放軍將特種部隊定義為能夠實現戰略目標的小規模精銳戰鬥部隊。

　　根據對美英等其他國家的特種部隊在近幾年衝突中的行動的分析，中國的戰略家設想了人民解放軍特種部隊可能扮演的多種角色，如在未來的軍事衝突中實施戰略偵察和直接軍事行動、參與心理和資訊戰以及支援大部隊。

　　無論是開展獨立的戰略偵察和直接的軍事行動抑或支援主要部隊，人民解放軍的特種部隊幾乎肯定在針對臺灣的軍事行動中扮演十分重要的角色。例如，特種部隊可以收集有關臺灣空軍基地或當局和軍事設施等關鍵目標的精確打擊資料，並且評估這種打擊的有效性。

　　外界對中國實際的特種作戰能力並不清楚。但是，即便人民解放軍的特種部隊比不上世界頂尖的特種部隊，他們仍然能在從武力威懾到全面進攻等一系列旨在實現政治目標的行動中，對臺灣——或許還有美國軍隊形成巨大挑戰。▲（作者邁克爾·蔡斯，汪析譯）

《環球時報》 ( 2007-02-25 第06版 )

CHINESE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES: “LESSONS LEARNED” AND POTENTIAL MISSIONS

By Michael S. Chase

Over the past 10-15 years, China has placed increasing emphasis on the development and improvement of its special operations forces [1]. According to the 2000 U.S. Department of Defense report on Chinese military power, “Particularly since the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict, the PLA has devoted considerable resources to the development of Special Operations Forces (SOF).” Moreover, the PLA identified the further development of these elite units as “an integral element of ground force modernization” [2]. In keeping with this assessment, the PLA in the 1990s created a number of new SOF units, with capabilities similar to U.S. Army Ranger units, as a complement to its existing long-range reconnaissance forces [3]. This emphasis on enhancing SOF capabilities was sparked at least in part by Chinese analysis of the role of special operations in conflicts such as the Falkland Islands War and the Gulf War. According to PLA strategists, one of the key lessons of these conflicts was that “special warfare has become an indispensable and important combat operation in modern campaigns” [4].
The level of priority accorded to improving SOF capabilities seems to have grown even further over the past few years, as reflected by a passage in China’s 2006 National Defense White Paper, which identifies improving special operations capabilities as one of the Army’s major military modernization priorities. The white paper states, “The Army aims at moving from regional defense to trans-regional mobility, and improving its capabilities in air-ground integrated operations, long-distance maneuvers, rapid assaults and special operations.” This increasingly strong interest in special operations capabilities almost certainly derives from Chinese analysis of the role of special operations units in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. It appears that Chinese analysts have devoted a considerable amount of attention to observing and analyzing the performance of U.S. and coalition special operations forces in both of these conflicts. Indeed, the Academy of Military Science (AMS) and Central Military Commission (CMC) reportedly established special research taskforces to analyze the role of special operations in Operation Enduring Freedom (South China Morning Post, March 4, 2002).
Chinese analysts argue that the role of SOF in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and other recent conflicts underscores their increasing importance in fighting “local wars under informatized conditions.” For example, one recent Chinese article concludes that special operations forces have emerged from the shadows and moved to the center of the stage as a result of their central role in recent conflicts. According to the author of this analysis, SOF achieved "striking results in battle" in Afghanistan and the status of special operations forces increased even further following their widespread employment in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), during which they conducted a variety of missions, including special reconnaissance, targeting for air strikes, direct action in the enemy's rear area, disruption of enemy logistics and search and rescue, as well as playing a key role in the “decapitation” strategy and participating directly in major combat operations [5]. According to the author of this article, the influence of special operations is no longer relegated to the tactical and operational levels. On the contrary, the author asserts, SOF units are capable of directly achieving strategic aims. Consequently, the author concludes, SOF units have become an important force in high-tech local wars; they are indispensable to commanders because of their flexibility and utility, not only in low-intensity conflicts, but also in mid-to-high intensity warfare. Accordingly, the modernization of SOF units should receive a very high priority and the development of elite units should focus on “informatized construction” and realistic training.
This analysis is consistent with the findings of a number of recent articles in PLA Daily and other Chinese newspapers, which have highlighted the role of U.S. and coalition SOF in the war on terror, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. Most of these articles reflect a favorable view of the potential contributions of SOF, but some also address the challenges of conducting special operations. For example, a January 2007 article on U.S. air strikes against al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia stated that opportunities to target the leaders of terrorist groups have been limited by the difficulties of acquiring actionable intelligence on the whereabouts of these elusive “high-value targets” (People’s Daily, January 14).

Chinese Views on the Characteristics of Special Operations Forces

Chinese assessments of the role of foreign special operations forces in recent conflicts are an important influence on the development of the PLA’s own SOF capabilities. Although much of the available Chinese writing on special operations focuses on assessing foreign experiences, some publications offer insights into how the PLA plans to apply these “lessons learned” to its own operations. At a general level, PLA writings on special operations define SOF units as elite combat units capable of conducting operations that may achieve strategic results despite their small numbers. For example, according to a 2002 China Militia article, the principle characteristic of small, elite special forces units, which are "very well equipped" (裝備精良) and "highly trained" (訓練有素), is that they are "of unimposing stature but very strong and capable" (短小精悍) [6].
Some Chinese military publications go into greater detail, analyzing the characteristics of SOF and describing the potential roles of PLA special operations units in future warfare. Most notable in this regard is The Science of Campaigns, which defines “campaign special warfare” (戰役特種戰) as a series of combat operations conducted by specially trained and equipped elite forces employing special tactics [7]. Among the strengths of SOF units, according to this volume, are their survivability, self-reliance and flexibility (靈活性). SOF groups range in size from just a handful to a few dozen and serve multi-functional objectives. They usually operate in the enemy’s “campaign deep areas,” where they carry out operations that are integral to the success of a campaign. They are capable of conducting a variety of missions, and rapidly changing elements of their missions when necessary to achieve their general objectives. Chinese writers emphasize that the success of special warfare operations depends upon the elements of surprise and covertness. It is most difficult for an enemy to defend against special operations attacks when they are “sudden” and “covert.” This means that to complete their missions successfully, SOF teams must launch surprise attacks, striking “at unexpected times and locations with unexpected combat methods and means” [8]. Given these characteristics, “special warfare is timed mainly to take advantage of the darkness of night, bad weather, and the enemy’s negligence.”
Based on this analysis of the characteristics and capabilities of SOF, PLA writers discuss a number of potential missions. According to The Science of Campaigns, for example, SOF can be employed to achieve a variety of general operational and strategic objectives, including attacking critical targets and infrastructure, “paralyzing the enemy’s combat system,” reducing the enemy’s combat capabilities, interfering with the enemy’s combat operations and “creating favorable conditions for the main force” [9]. More specifically, SOF missions may include: conducting strategic reconnaissance and collecting intelligence; capturing or assassinating key enemy personnel; engaging in harassment actions; participating in psychological operations; taking part in information and electronic warfare campaigns and launching direct attacks on targets such as airbases, ports, bridges, command and control facilities, radar sites, critical weapons systems, transportation and communications hubs and other rear area logistics facilities, bases and depots. If required, SOF can also provide direct support to main forces by “concentrating a certain number of special forces to seize key targets and key points in an enemy’s deep area in order to directly help the offensive of the main force” [10]. In addition, other sources indicate that SOF units may participate in a variety of potential domestic missions, such as counter-terrorism operations, hostage rescue and perhaps even responding to “unexpected incidents” such as riots and outbreaks of social unrest.

Implications for a China-Taiwan Conflict

Although PLA writers generally refrain from discussing potential SOF missions in Taiwan scenarios, the more general analysis they provide sheds some light on how China would likely employ its special operations capabilities in a cross-Strait conflict. Indeed, these writings suggest that Chinese SOF would likely conduct a broad range of direct action, strategic reconnaissance and other special missions in the event of a conflict with Taiwan. Similarly, the U.S. Department of Defense assesses that specific missions assigned to PLA SOF units in Taiwan contingency operations would likely include “conducting reconnaissance and surveillance; locating or destroying C4I assets, transport nodes, and logistics depots; capturing or destroying airfields and ports; and destroying air defense facilities” (DoD Report on PRC Military Power , 2000).
In a Taiwan conflict, PLA special operations units would probably play a particularly important role in strategic reconnaissance and battle damage assessment (BDA) missions by supplementing China’s growing space-based and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. For example, SOF units could provide targeting data for precision strikes against critical military targets such as Taiwan’s major airbases or other government and military facilities. They could also assess the effectiveness of attacks on such targets. Moreover, Chinese media reports indicate that SOF units would conduct strategic reconnaissance missions perhaps as far away as “several hundred or thousand kilometers,” which suggests that PLA SOF might also attempt to conduct such missions against U.S. military bases in the region [11]. Potential direct action missions would include attacks on Taiwan’s airbases, command and control facilities, ISR assets, and key logistics and transportation targets such as major highways and bridges. PLA SOF could also support the efforts of main forces by seizing control of ports or airfields to facilitate their arrival on the island.
Whether independently conducting strategic reconnaissance and direct action missions or supporting main forces, PLA SOF would almost certainly play an important role in almost any type of military operation against Taiwan, ranging from a limited, coercive use of force to a full-scale amphibious invasion. In particular, special operations might be an especially critical factor in a decapitation strategy scenario, in which the PLA would attempt to overthrow Taiwan’s democratically elected government by capturing or killing senior civilian officials and paralyze the military by degrading the ability of commanders to communicate with forces in the field [12]. As part of a decapitation strike, analysts in Taiwan have speculated that the PLA would launch missile strikes or carry out special operations attacks against the Presidential Palace in Taipei and other important national-level command and control facilities to eliminate pro-independence leaders and paralyze the armed forces (Taipei Times, October 5, 2004). In such a scenario, SOF units would probably infiltrate Taiwan long before the initiation of hostilities and then undertake missions, such as seizing key leadership facilities, attacking key communications nodes and supporting psychological and information operations. Although this would seem like a very high-risk strategy for the PLA, and one with a significant probability of failure, the threat of a potential decapitation strike cannot be ruled out entirely. Indeed, Taiwan has used scenarios involving PLA decapitation strikes in some of its recent military exercises (Taipei Times, April 13, 2005).

Conclusion

Chinese analysts have carefully studied the role of foreign SOF in military operations from the Falkland Islands War to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Based on China’s analysis of U.S., British, and other foreign special operations in recent years, Chinese strategists envision SOF playing a variety of roles—conducting strategic reconnaissance and direct action missions, participating in psychological and information operations and possibly supporting main forces—in future military conflicts. Although often implied rather than stated explicitly in Chinese writings, this almost certainly includes Taiwan contingencies. There are many uncertainties regarding actual Chinese special operations capabilities, but even if PLA SOF units are not on par with the world’s leading special operations units, they could nevertheless pose a serious threat to Taiwan—and perhaps to U.S. forces as well—in a variety of conflict scenarios, ranging from a coercive campaign intended to achieve limited political objectives to a full-scale invasion attempt. Preparing to counter the Chinese SOF threat thus represents a growing challenge for planners and policymakers in Taiwan and the United States.

Notes

1. For an excellent overview of the organizational history of Chinese special forces, which also discusses the PLAN Marines, PLAAF airborne troops and the PAP’s special armed police units, see Qu Xiaohua, Liu Zhanyong, and Shi Jun, Achieving Victory through Surprise: Special Warfare [出奇制勝: 特種戰], Hebei, China: Hebei Science and Technology Press, 2000.
2. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2000, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2000, from hereinafter referred to in-text as “DoD Report on PRC Military Power, 2000.”
3. Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 21.
4. Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, ed., The Science of Campaigns [戰役學], Beijing, China: National Defense University Press, 2000, pp. 213-214.
5. Gu Fengshan, "The 'Shadow War' Takes the 'Stage,'" (“影子战争”走向“前台” ) Military Salon (Junshi Shalong), September 14, 2004, available online at http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/jsslpdjs/2004-09/14/content_132406.htm.
6. Feng Lang, "Scanning the World's Counterterrorism Special Forces Units," (扫描世界反恐怖特種部队), China Militia (中國民兵), 2:209 (2002), http://www.chinamil.com.cn/item/zgmb/200202/txt/32.htm.
7. Wang and Zhang, ed., The Science of Campaigns. The authors describe special warfare as a form of “precision” (精確) attack that is carried out by small groups of highly trained operators.
8. Ibid., pp. 214-216.
9. Ibid., pp. 214-216.
10. Ibid., pp. 216-218.
11. “Walking into Special Forces’ Drill Ground,” Shanghai Liberation Daily [上海解放日報], May 30, 2001, in FBIS.
12. Jui-Kuang Lee, “Year 2005-2010: Evaluation of China’s Implementation of Decapitation Warfare Against Taiwan,” Taiwan Defense Affairs (國防政策評論), 4:3 (Spring 2004).