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第二次世界大戰期間蘇聯紅軍,視死如歸保家衛國,犧小我完成使命,尤其是在史達林格勒保衛戰役,不惜代價與納粹黨軍作戰抵抗納粹黨德軍最後的絕地大反攻蘇聯紅軍打敗德國佔領柏林.Soldiers from the Soviet Red Army after capturing Berlin.
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Red Army soldiers raising the Soviet flag over the Reichstag in Berlin, on May 2, 1945..
A 94-year-old World War II veteran born in modern-day Armenia has started a Reddit AMA, with the help of his granddaughter, in which he provides a startling look at his time as a conscript in the Soviet Red Army.
.A Red Army officer instructs his men on the Maxim machine-gun
Leon Trotsky, the Commissar of War, was appointed the head of the Red Army on 13th March, 1918. The army had to be established quickly as it was needed to fight the White Army during the Civil War. Trotsky was forced to recruit a large number of officers from the old Russian Army. He was criticized for this but he argued that it would be impossible to fight the war without the employment of experienced army officers.
Initially a volunteer army, losses during the Civil War forced the Soviet government to introduce conscription in June, 1918. Lenin was impressed by Trotskys achievements and in 1919 remarked to Maxim Gorky: "Show me another man who could have practically created a model army in a year and won respect of the military specialist as well.".
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German soldiers surrendering to the Red Army units near Vitovka village, 1941..
he largest Soviet airborne operation of World War II took place during fighting around Vyazma in January and February 1942.
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Soviet T-26 light tanks and GAZ-A trucks of the Soviet 7th Army during its advance on the Karelian Isthmus, December 2, 1939.
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In late November 1942 the Red Army had completed Operation Uranus, encircling some 300,000 Axis personnel in and around the city of Stalingrad. German forces within the Stalingrad pocket and directly outside were reorganized (22 November 1942) into Army Group Don and placed under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. The Red Army continued to allocate as many resources as possible to the planned Operation Saturn to isolate Army Group A from the rest of the German Army. To remedy the situation, the Luftwaffe attempted to supply German forces in Stalingrad through an air bridge. When the Luftwaffe failed and it became obvious that a breakout could succeed only if launched as early as possible, Manstein decided on a relief effort.
.Conscription into the Red Army was difficult to avoid, between internal travel controls, ration cards and the machinery of the Stalinist police state, it was almost impossible to avoid the draft.
The Soviet Union did have a system of exemptions from military service for men with essential skills (engineering, technicians, scientists and the like) but like much of the Soviet economy, it was not well-administered.
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Joseph Stalin supposedly claimed that “quantity has a quality all its own,” justifying a cannon-fodder mentality and immense casualties. The problem is, Stalin never actually said that, but it fits our stereotype about the Russian military so neatly that everyone believes he did.
When it comes to war, Russia is commonly perceived as favoring quantity over quality and winning mainly by overwhelming its opponents with hordes of poorly trained soldiers. You can hardly find any account of Russia’s wars that does not use terms like “hordes,” “masses,” and even “Neolithic swarms.” Quantity, it is believed, made quality almost irrelevant.
German generals propagated the myth of a Red Army comprised of faceless masses of troops, motivated only by NKVD rifles at their backs and winning only through sheer force of numbers. Many Western histories accept this view, and it is standard fare in Hollywood, notably in the 2001 Enemy at the Gates. The story was also standard fare during the Cold War, when the intelligence community frequently overestimated the quantitative side of Soviet capabilities while belittling its quality.
When it comes to war, Russia is commonly perceived as favoring quantity over quality and winning mainly by overwhelming its opponents with hordes of poorly trained soldiers. You can hardly find any account of Russia’s wars that does not use terms like “hordes,” “masses,” and even “Neolithic swarms.” Quantity, it is believed, made quality almost irrelevant.
German generals propagated the myth of a Red Army comprised of faceless masses of troops, motivated only by NKVD rifles at their backs and winning only through sheer force of numbers. Many Western histories accept this view, and it is standard fare in Hollywood, notably in the 2001 Enemy at the Gates. The story was also standard fare during the Cold War, when the intelligence community frequently overestimated the quantitative side of Soviet capabilities while belittling its quality.
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The Red Army was outnumbered by Axis forces in 1941 at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. Soviet mobilization efforts and steady German losses began to change the force ratios in 1942, but the Red Army only had a roughly 2:1 advantage from February 1943 until mid-1944 before maxing out at a little over 4: 1 at the very end of the war.
